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Abstract
We study the problem of computing the minimum adversarial perturbation of the Nearest Neighbor
(NN) classifiers. Previous attempts either conduct attacks on continuous approximations of NN models
or search for the perturbation by some heuristic methods. In this paper, we propose the first algorithm
that is able to compute the minimum adversarial perturbation. The main idea is to formulate the problem
as a list of convex quadratic programming (QP) problems that can be efficiently solved by the proposed
algorithms for 1-NN models. Furthermore, we show that dual solutions for these QP problems could give
us a valid lower bound of the adversarial perturbation that can be used for formal robustness verification,
giving us a nice view of attack/verification for NN models. For K-NN models with larger K, we show
that the same formulation can help us efficiently compute the upper and lower bounds of the minimum
adversarial perturbation, which can be used for attack and verification.
1 Introduction
Adversarial robustness of neural networks has been extensively studied in the past few years. Given a data
point, adversarial attacks are developed to construct small imperceptible input perturbations to alter the
predicted label [26, 13, 5, 2, 4]. On the other hand, robustness verification algorithms are also developed
to compute a “safe region” around the point such that the prediction is provably unchanged within such
region [31, 29, 34, 11]. An attack algorithm can be viewed as finding an upper bound of the “minimum
adversarial perturbation” while a verification algorithm finds a lower bound of this value. In fact, robustness
verification is often more important than attacks, since a verifiable behavior is required for mission-critical
systems. For neural network models, due to non-convexity, both attack and verification cannot reach the
minimum adversarial perturbation, and there is still a huge gap between the (computable) upper and lower
bounds [24].
We study the problem of evaluating the robustness of the Nearest Neighbor (NN) classifiers. As a
non-continuous step function, NN classifiers are very different from neural networks, and the neural network
attack and verification methods cannot be directly applied to them. Previous attempts on attacking nearest
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neighbor models either use some simple heuristics [25] or apply gradient-based attacks to some continuous
substitute models of NN [25, 22, 10]. Unfortunately, these attacks are far from optimal and do not have any
theoretical guarantee. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing approach on computing the minimum
adversarial perturbation that can change an NN classifier’s output, and there is no existing verification method
that can compute a meaningful lower bound of the safe region.
In this paper, we first study the 1-NN classifier and show that finding the minimum adversarial perturbation
can be formulated as a set of convex quadratic programming (QP) problems, and a solution can be computed
in polynomial time [16]. This is quite different from neural networks or tree-based models where finding
the minimum perturbation has shown to be NP-hard [15, 14]. Furthermore, our formulation provides a very
clean view of attack and verification for nearest neighbor classifiers. An attacker could solve any QP problem
and any feasible solution will be a successful attack; a verifier could solve the dual of these problems and
any feasible solution set will lead to a guaranteed lower bound of the minimum adversarial perturbation.
Moreover, the primal minimum and dual maximum will match at the value of the minimum adversarial
perturbation. We show that the QP problems can be solved efficiently by greedy coordinate ascent, and based
on this primal-dual perspective, we further provide several screening rules to speed up the quadratic solvers.
When extending to K-NN models with K > 1, our QP formulation will have the number of constraints
growing exponentially with K. However, we can still approximately solve the primal problems, and that
will give an attack algorithm outperforming previous works. Furthermore, we propose a way to set dual
feasible solutions to provide a tight lower bound of the minimum adversarial perturbation without solving any
problem. This leads to an efficient K-NN verification algorithm that works for any K.
We conduct experiments on real datasets and have the following interesting findings:
• For 1-NN models, our proposed algorithm can efficiently compute the minimum adversarial pertur-
bation. Our algorithm is provably optimal, achieves much smaller value, and is more efficient than
previous attack methods. Also, this is the first robustness verification method for NN models.
• For K-NN models with larger K, computing the exact minimum adversarial perturbation is still
challenging, but our formulation provides an efficient attack algorithm, which outperforms previous
attack methods. More importantly, our dual problems lead to an efficient verification algorithm to
compute the lower bound of adversarial perturbation and have time complexity independent to K.
Experiments show that the bounds are reasonably tight.
• Equipped with our algorithm, we accurately compute the robust error bound of the 1-NN model on
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. We find that a simple 1-NN model can achieve better robust error than
CNN on these data.
2 Related work
Adversarial robustness of neural networks. Adversarial robustness of neural networks has been studied
extensively in the past few years. To evaluate the robustness of neural networks, attack algorithms are
developed to find adversarial examples that are close to the original example [5, 13, 18, 7, 8]. However, due to
the non-convexity of neural networks, these attacks cannot reach the minimum perturbation so they can only
provide some upper bound of robustness and cannot provide any robustness guarantee. For safety-critical
applications such as real-world control systems, it is essential to have robustness guarantees such that we
know the prediction is provably unchanged within a certain distance. This motivates recent studies on neural
network verification which aims to compute a lower bound of the minimum adversarial perturbation [30, 31,
29, 12, 27, 34, 35]. Also, many of these robustness verification bounds can be incorporated in the training
procedure to obtain “verifiable” networks [31, 32, 19].
2
Adversarial robustness of nearest neighbor classifiers. Adversarial robustness of nearest neighbor
classifiers is less studied. Unfortunately, the algorithms mentioned above designed for neural networks cannot
be directly applied to NN models since NN models are discrete step functions. [28] discussed the robustness
ofK-NN from the theoretical perspective and showed that the robustness ofK-NN can approach the Bayesian
optimal classifier. To compute an upper bound of the minimum adversarial perturbation (or equivalently,
attack), [22] proposed to employ a differentiable substitute for attacking 1-NN models; [25] proposed some
heuristic methods and another gradient-based model to attack another kind of continuous substitute of K-NN.
We will show in Section 3 that they cannot obtain the minimum adversarial perturbation and in experiments
that they lead to loose upper bounds. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing
approach on computing the minimum adversarial perturbation or its lower bound, so our work is the first to
verify the NN models. Finally, there are some recent work using NN models for defense, including [21, 10].
However, they usually combine NN with neural network models, which are out of the scope of this paper.
3 Background and motivation
First, we set up notations for the Nearest Neighbor (NN) classifiers. Assume there are C labels in total.
We use {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} to denote the database where each xi is a d-dimensional vector and yi ∈
{1, . . . , C} is the corresponding label. A K-NN classifier f : Rd → {1, . . . , C} maps a test instance to
a predicted label. Given a test instance z ∈ Rd, the classifier will first identify the K-nearest neighbors
{xpi(1), . . . ,xpi(K)} based on the Euclidean distance ‖xi − z‖ and then predict the final label by majority
voting among {ypi(1), . . . , ypi(K)}.
Next we define the notions of adversarial robustness, attack, and verification. Given a test sample z and
without loss of generality, we assume it is correctly classified as class-1 by the NN model. An adversarial
perturbation is defined as δ ∈ Rd such that f(z+δ) 6= 1. An attack algorithm aims to find the minimum-norm
adversarial perturbation, and its norm is
∗ =
{
min
δ
‖δ‖ s.t. f(z + δ) 6= 1}. (1)
A verification algorithm aims to find a lower bound r such that
f(z + δ) = 1, ∀‖δ‖ ≤ r.
Clearly, by definition the maximum lower bound r∗ will match with the minimum perturbation norm ∗ if
we have optimal attack and verification. We will mainly focus on `2 norm but will briefly talk about how to
extend to `∞ and `1 norms later. Also, we will focus on 1-NN first and then generalize to K > 1 later.
Failure cases of previous attack methods. At first glance, the minimum adversarial perturbation seems
to be easy to compute for the 1-NN model. For instance, [25] mentioned that the minimum adversarial
perturbation has to be on the straight line connecting z and one of the training instances belonging to a
different class (yi 6= 1), so a simple linear time algorithm can solve this problem. Unfortunately, this claim is
not true. In Figure 1, we show that the optimal perturbation may not be on the lines connecting two points and
furthermore, only checking the line segments can find an arbitrary bad solution. Other previous approaches try
to form a continuous approximation of NN classifiers [25, 22, 10], and clearly, they cannot find the optimal
perturbation.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the minimum adversarial perturbation for 1-NN model. The goal is to perturb z
to be classified as triangle. In (a), the red curve is the perturbation computed by [25] while the optimal
solution (blue perturbation, ∗) could be much better, and the ratio can be arbitrary large by changing the
angle between red and blue. (b) shows that projection to the bisection hyperplanes may not be optimal; one
also needs to consider intersections of several bisections which can be exponentially many. (c) shows that
the optimal perturbation can be computed by evaluating the distance from z to each Voronoi cell of triangle
instances.
Connection to Voronoi diagrams and a solution for low-dimensional cases. In fact, the decision bound-
ary of a 1-NN model can be captured by the Voronoi diagram (see Figure 1(c)). In the Voronoi diagram, each
training instance xi forms a cell, and the decision boundary of the cell is captured by the convex boundary
formed by bisections between xi and its neighbors. One can thus obtain the minimum adversarial perturbation
by computing the distances from z to all the cells with yi 6= 1. However, to compute the distance, we need
to check all the faces (captured by one bisection hyperplane) and angles (intersections of more than one
bisection hyperplanes) of the cell.
For 2-dimensional space (d = 2), it has been shown in [3] that each cell can only have finite faces
and angles and there exists a polynomial time algorithm for computing a Voronoi diagram. In general, for
d-dimensional problems with n points, Voronoi diagram computation requires O(n log n+nd
d
2 e) time, which
works for low-dimensional problems. However, time complexity grows exponentially with dimension d, so in
general, it is hard to use this algorithm unless d is very small.
4 Primal-dual quadratic programming formulation
Usually, finding the minimum adversarial perturbation is hard. Computing minimum adversarial perturbations
for ReLU networks and tree ensembles are both NP-hard [15, 14]. Also, as discussed in the previous
section, we can connect it to Voronoi diagram computation, but the solver will require exponential time in
dimensionality. So is it NP-hard to compute the minimum adversarial perturbation for 1-NN? Surprisingly, it
is not as we will demonstrate below.
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4.1 Quadratic (primal) problems for minimum adversarial perturbation
We consider the 1-NN model. For a given instance z, if we want to perturb it so that z+δ is closer to xj with
yj 6= 1 than to all class-1 instances, then the problem of finding the minimum perturbation can be formulated
as:
(j) = min
δ
1
2
δT δ s.t. ‖z + δ − xj‖2 ≤ ‖z + δ − xi‖2, ∀i, yi = 1. (2)
Each constraint can be rewritten as δT (xj − xi) + ‖z−xi‖
2−‖z−xj‖2
2 ≥ 0. Therefore (2) becomes
(j) = min
δ:Aδ+b≥0
{1
2
δT δ} := P (j)(δ), (3)
where A ∈ Rn×d and b ∈ Rn, for each row i with yi = 1, ai = (xj − xi) and bi = ‖z−xi‖
2−‖z−xj‖2
2
respectively (0 otherwise). By solving the quadratic programming (QP) problem (3) for each {j : yj 6= 1},
the final minimum adversarial perturbation norm is ∗ = minj:yj 6=1
√
2(j). It has been shown that convex
quadratic programming can be solved in polynomial time [16], so our formulation leads to a polynomial
time algorithm for finding ∗.
4.2 Dual quadratic programming problems
We also introduce the dual form of each QP, which is more efficient to solve in practice and will lead to a
verification perspective of evaluating adversarial robustness. The dual problem of (3) can be written as
max
λ≥0
{−1
2
λTAATλ− λT b} := D(j)(λ), (4)
where λ ∈ Rn are the corresponding dual variables. The derivation is easy, but for completeness, we include
it in Appendix A.1. The primal-dual relationship connects primal and dual variables:
δ = ATλ.
Based on the weak duality, we have D(j)(λ) ≤ P (j)(δ) for any dual feasible solution λ and primal
feasible solution δ. Furthermore, based on Slater’s condition we can easily show that strong duality holds
(D(j)(λ∗) = P (j)(δ∗)) if xj 6= xi, ∀i, yi = 1. 1 Based on strong duality, we have
1
2
(∗)2= min
j:yj 6=1
{P (j)(δ∗)}= min
j:yj 6=1
{max
λ≥0
D(j)(λ)}≥ min
j:yj 6=1
{D(j)(λ(j))} with feasible λ(j), (5)
so any feasible solution {λ(j)} leads to a lower bound of the minimum adversarial perturbation. In summary,
we conclude the primal-dual relationship between 1-NN attack and verification:
• A primal feasible solution of P (j) for any yj 6= 1 is a successful attack and gives us an upper bound
of ∗. Therefore, one can solve QPs with a subset of j; usually a xj closer to z will lead to a smaller
adversarial perturbation, so in practice we can sort xj by the distance to z, solve the subproblems
one by one, and stop at any time. It will give a valid adversarial perturbation. After solving all the
subproblems, the result will be ∗.
• A set of dual feasible solutions {λ(j)}j:yj 6=1 will give a lower bound of ∗ according to (5). So any
heuristic method for setting up a set of dual feasible solutions will give us a lower bound which can be
used for robustness verification. After solving all the dual problems exactly, we will get the tightest
lower bound, which is also ∗.
1One can observe that if the condition holds (yj 6= 1) then a small ball around δ = xj − z will be feasible solutions which satisfies
Slater’s condition, implying strong convexity.
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1-NN verification. Here we give an example of how to quickly set up dual variables to give a lower bound
of the minimum adversarial perturbation without solving any problem. For a dual problem D(j), consider
only having one variable λ(j)i to be nonzero while fixing all the rest variables zero, the optimal closed-form
solution will be
λ
(j)
i = max(0,−
bi
‖ai‖2 ), D
(j)([0, . . . , 0, λ
(j)
i , 0, . . . , 0]) =
max(−bi, 0)2
2‖ai‖2 . (6)
Note that bi =
‖z−xi‖2−‖z−xj‖2
2 and ‖ai‖2 = ‖xj − xi‖2 both can be computed easily, so a guaranteed
lower bound of ∗ can be computed easily:
 = min
j:yj 6=1
(
max
i:yi=1
max(‖z − xj‖2 − ‖z − xi‖2, 0)
2‖xj − xi‖
) ≤ ∗. (7)
This value has an interesting geometrical meaning. See Appendix A.2 for more details. In general, we can
also get improved lower bounds by solving more coordinates for each subproblem.
4.3 Solving the QP problems efficiently
Now we discuss how to efficiently solve a series of QP problems {D(j)}j:yj 6=1 in practice. Although we can
do this in polynomial time, in practice a naive algorithm is still too slow. Note that we have totally O(n)
quadratic problems and each QP has O(n) variables to solve, so roughly more than O(n3) time complexity is
required for doing this naively. Calling a commercial quadratic programming solver will take 20 seconds for
n = 6000 when solving only one QP problem. In the following, we show how to solve “all” QP problems in
3 seconds.
First, we find that a greedy coordinate ascent algorithm can be efficiently applied to solve the dual QP
problem (4). This is mainly due to the sparsity of the solution—if λ∗ is dual optimal, then a nonzero λ∗i
means the primal constraint ‖z + δ − xj‖2 = ‖z + δ − xi‖2, so the optimal z + δ will be on the bisection
of (xi,xj). Therefore, if ‖λ∗‖0 = q then the optimal solution is the intersection of q bisection hyperplanes,
which means q is usually small. For instance, on MNIST dataset when we test on 100 subproblems, the
average number of ‖λ∗‖0 is only 50.06, with 7612.59 dual variables per subproblem. The sparsity of the
solution motivates the use of the greedy coordinate ascent algorithm. Starting from λ = 0, we maintain the
gradient vector with g = −AATλ− b and every time we pick the variable with the largest projected gradient
i∗ = arg max
i
|(max(λ+ g, 0)− λ)i|
and then update a single variable λi∗ ← max(λi∗ + gi∗/‖ai∗‖2, 0). This is similar to the SMO method
proposed for training kernel SVM [23, 6], but since there is no equality constraint we only need to pick one
variable at a time. Since there are only a few nonzero λs, the algorithm usually converges much quicker than
standard quadratic optimization solvers.
Second, we propose a screening rule to remove variables in each dual QP problem (4). There are only a
few nonzero variables, and our screening rule will reduce the size of variables before solving the problem. We
introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For a specific quadratic problem P (j)(δ), the optimal dual solution has λ∗i = 0 if
−(‖z − xi‖2 − ‖z − xj‖2)/2 + ‖xj − xi‖‖δ∗‖ < 0, (8)
where δ∗ is the optimal solution.
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The proof is in Appendix A.3. Note that checking (8) does not need to solve the QP problem. To conduct
the screening rule in (8), we need to have an estimation of ‖δ∗‖ or its upper bound. A naive upper bound
‖δ∗‖ ≤ ‖xj − z‖ can be used for running the screening rule.
With the methods mentioned above, each dual QP can be solved efficiently. However, there are O(n)
QPs in total, and solving all of them is still expensive. However, the final solution ∗ only depends on the
minimum among solutions of all QPs, so can we remove most of the irrelevant QPs?
We can use primal-dual relationship for removing most of the QP problems before solving them. Assume
we have a primal solution δ¯ then the minimum adversarial perturbation norm ∗ ≤ ‖δ¯‖, so every dual problem
with D(j)(λ) > δ¯T δ¯/2 for some λ can be removed. For a subproblem with respect to xj , based on (6) we
know the subproblem can be removed if
δ¯T δ¯ < max(−bi, 0)2/‖ai‖2 (9)
for some i, thus we can use (9) to remove some unimportant subproblems. In practice, we sort the subproblems
in ascending order of ‖z − xj‖ and iteratively run the screening rule after solving one more subproblem. As
a result, most of the subproblems can be removed without solving them, and we achieve significant speedup.
Our overall algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Computing minimum adversarial perturbation
Input: Target instance z, database {(xj , yj)}nj=1.
1 Initial  =∞ ;
2 Sort subproblems {D(j)}j:yj 6=1 by ascending distances of ‖z − xj‖;
3 for each j (according to the sorted order) do
4 if not screenable via (9) then
5 Solve the subproblem via greedy coordinate ascent with screening rule (8);
6 Update  if we get a smaller value;
7 end
8 end
4.4 Extending to `1 and `∞ norms
Sometimes people are interested in finding the minimum `∞ or `1 norm adversarial perturbation (replacing
the `2 norm in (1)). Those can be solved similarly using our framework but will require linear programming
instead of quadratic programming. For example, the minimum `∞-norm adversarial perturbation can be
formulated as
(j) = min
δ
v s.t. Aδ + b ≥ 0, v ≥ δi ≥ −v ∀i = 1, . . . , d.
A similar formulation can be done for the `1 case. This can also be solved efficiently by linear programming
solvers and the primal-dual relationship also holds.
4.5 Extending beyond 1-NN
We can extend our approach to K-NN with K > 1 by adding more constraints. Taking the 3-NN model and
binary classification as an example, we can list all the possible combinations of {(j1, j2, j3) | yj1 = yj2 =
7
2, yj3 = 1} and then solve the following QP problem to force z + δ to be closer to xj1 ,xj2 than to all the
class-1 instances except xj3 :
(j1,j2,j3)=min
δ
1
2
δT δ s.t. ‖z + δ − xj‖2 ≤ ‖z + δ − xi‖2, ∀i, i 6= j3, yi = 1, j ∈ {j1, j2}.
There will be O(2n) constraints so will be more expensive to solve. For general K > 1, we can write a
similar formulation with O(nK) constraints, but since the QP still has a sparse solution, greedy coordinate
ascent can still solve a subproblem efficiently. Using this we can still obtain an upper and lower bound,
corresponding to attack and verification. For an upper bound (attack), we just need to heuristically choose
some (j1, j2, j3) tuples according to the distance to z and solve some QPs (more details in Appendix A.4).
For a lower bound, we can use the similar formulation to (7) as below:
Efficient verification for K > 1. We can apply (5) efficiently even for large K. Taking the K = 3 case as
an example, let Ci,j =
max(‖z−xj‖2−‖z−xi‖2,0)
2‖xj−xi‖ then with some simple derivation we can get the verification
bound for K = 3 case
min
(j1,j2,j3):yj1=2,yj2=2,yj3=1
(
max
i 6=j3
(max(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2))
) ≥ min
(j1,j2):yj1=2,yj2=2
max(Dj1 , Dj2)
where Dj = mint,yt=1(maxi6=t,yi=1 Ci,j), which is the second largest value among Ci,j for all i. Therefore,
we just need to choose the second smallest of Dj among {j : yj = 2}. Note that this can be generalized to a
general K case, where the verification lower bound becomes:
 := {kthmin
j:yj=2
(kthmax
i:yi=1
Cij )} ≤ ∗, k = (K + 1)/2, (10)
which can be computed efficiently with time complexity independent to K.
5 Experiments
We show main results in Section 5.1, and analyze efficiency of our algorithm in Section 5.2. All experiments
are run on a cloud server with one Intel E5-2650V4 CPU and one NVIDIA V100 GPU.
5.1 Comparison of adversarial perturbations
We show that our formulation leads to better attack and verification algorithms. Note that our QP framework
leads to the following proposed algorithms for exact computation, verification, and attack:
• Exact: computes the exact minimum adversarial perturbation for 1-NN via Algorithm 1.
• Verifier: computes a lower bound for 1-NN via (7) and for K-NN via (10).
• QP-1 and QP-10: compute upper bounds (attack) for 1-NN via Algorithm 1 but only iterate over the
top-1 and top-10 QP problems respectively.
• QP-greedy: computes an upper bound for K-NN by heuristically choosing QP subproblems (Ap-
pendix A.4).
Note that there is no existing algorithm for computing the exact minimum adversarial perturbation and no
existing verification method for K-NN that can compute a lower bound. Therefore we are only able to
compare with the following attack methods:
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Table 1: Mean perturbations and the total runtime of 100 correctly classified test instances for 1-NN. We
repeat 5 times to report the mean of total runtime.
MNIST Fashion-MNIST
Perturbation (`2) Runtime (s) Perturbation (`2) Runtime (s)
Exact 1.491 177.507 1.128 130.795
Lower bounds Verifier 1.370 101.850 1.073 100.651
Upper bounds
QP-1 1.530 43.676 1.142 38.344
QP-10 1.491 108.390 1.128 65.947
Naive-1 1.851 145.299 1.446 115.820
Naive-10 1.755 512.164 1.413 504.344
Mean 4.561 40.951 4.179 39.423
Substitute 1.616 164.153 1.264 145.797
Table 2: Mean perturbations of 100 correctly classified test instances for K-NN.
K = 1 K = 3 K = 5 K = 7 K = 9
Lower bounds Verifier 2.268 2.230 2.201 2.193 2.183
Upper bounds
QP-greedy 2.494 3.089 3.417 3.636 3.786
Naive-1 2.894 3.718 3.903 4.085 4.173
Mean 5.282 5.241 5.205 5.191 5.176
• Naive-1 and Naive-10 [1, 25]: compute upper bounds for 1-NN by moving towards a nearby other-class
instance (belonging to a class different from the one of the test instance). Naive-10 repeats the process
for 10 times and chooses the best perturbation. For K > 1, Naive-1 moves towards a nearby size
(K + 1)/2 other-class cluster.
• Mean [25]: computes an upper bound for K-NN by moving towards a class mean. The target class is
chosen by the class mean distance to the test instance.
• Substitute [22]: computes an upper bound for 1-NN by attacking a smoothed variant of NN.
All attack methods are tuned to have 100% attack success rates, such that the perturbation is strictly the upper
bound for the minimum adversarial perturbation.
Perturbations for 1-NN. Experiments are performed on MNIST [17] and Fashion-MNIST [33]. As Table 1
shows, Algorithm 1 (Exact) can efficiently compute the minimum adversarial perturbation. Verifier can
compute a reasonable lower bound without solving any QP problems exactly. QP-1 and QP-10 are efficient
and effective attack methods by iterating over only a few QP problems.
Perturbations with larger K. Experiments are performed on Binary-MNIST, where label 8 and label 0
are used. Verifier and QP-greedy compute tight lower bounds and upper bounds respectively as shown in
Table 2. More results are in Appendix A.5.
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Table 3: Comparison of robustness for 1-NN and neural networks with the same `∞ perturbation.
Dataset Model  Test error Attack error Verifiable robust error
MNIST Neural Net 0.1 1.07% 81.68% 100%1-NN 0.1 3.41% 27.06% 27.06%
Fashion-MNIST Neural Net 0.1 9.36% 81.85% 100%1-NN 0.1 23.47% 78.25% 78.25%
Comparing robust error under `∞-norm perturbation. In this experiment, we compare the robustness
of 1-NN model with the CNN model on two datasets in Table 3. The CNN model has two convolutional
layers and two fully connected layers with ReLU activations. We observe that neural nets have better test
error, which is known in the literature. However, if we compare the error under the same amount of attack,
1-NN outperforms neural nets on these two datasets. Furthermore, since 1-NN is easy to verify using our
approach, and it is NP-hard to compute the minimum adversarial perturbation for a neural network, 1-NN
can have much better verifiable robust error than neural nets. Note that we use one of the state-of-the-art
verification methods in [31] for computing the verifiable robust error of neural nets. We do not claim 1-NN is
a better model than neural nets. For more complex datasets such as CIFAR or ImageNet, the 1-NN method
will lead to bad clean error, so it is not comparable with neural nets. However, we think this experiment
suggests that for some simple data, NN models could be a better choice in terms of the robustness error.
5.2 Efficiency of our algorithm
We already show Algorithm 1 is efficient in Table 1. It has three components: sorting, screening rules for
reducing the number of QPs, and the greedy coordinate ascent solver for each QP. We leave the experiments
about sorting in Appendix A.6 and talk about the other two in detail.
Screening. In the MNIST case, for every test instance, we have to solve about 54, 000 (all other-class
instances) QP problems without screening. While with sorting and screening, only 2.53 QP problems on
average are left to solve. Therefore screening improves efficiency significantly. The screening parameter nscr
(number of is chosen for each j in (9)) is also an important parameter for efficiency. There is a trade-off
between the number of screened subproblems and the screening overheads controlled by nscr. We plot the
tradeoff on MNIST in Figure 2. This shows a very small nscr is enough, and we choose 8 for our experiments.
Greedy coordinate ascent. Due to the sparsity of each QP problem, the greedy coordinate ascent solver is
much more efficient than other standard QP solvers. To verify this, we compare greedy coordinate ascent
with SCS [20], CVXOPT and ECOS [9] for solving these QP problems. We fix everything the same (with the
same screening rule and sorting technique) while only change the QP solver. Since it is difficult for standard
QP solvers to deal with high dimensional problems, 1/10 training samples of MNIST are used. The results
are presented in Figure 3. Greedy coordinate ascent is faster than other solvers by more than 60 times for
computing K-NN robustness.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that computing the minimum adversarial perturbation of K-NN models can be
formulated as a series of quadratic programming problems. This framework is the first algorithm that can
compute the minimum adversarial perturbation, and we propose an efficient solver such that the computation
time is comparable with and often faster than previous attack algorithms. Furthermore, our framework also
motivates the first algorithm for verifying K-NN robustness from the dual aspect.
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A Appendixes
A.1 Derivation of the dual form
Consider the primal problem in (3). The Lagrangian can be written as
L(δ,λ) =
1
2
δT δ − λT (Aδ + b)
The dual problem is then
max
λ≥0
min
δ
L(δ,λ)
Taking derivative of Lagrangian we get
∂
∂δ
L = δ −ATλ = 0,
which gives us the primal-dual relationship δ = ATλ. Substitute this back to the dual problem we get
max
λ≥0
−1
2
λTAATλ− λT b.
A.2 Geometric meaning of our verification bound
Here we discuss the geometric meaning of the following verification bound for 1-NN (derived in (7)):
 = min
j:yj 6=1
(
max
i:yi=1
max(‖z − xj‖2 − ‖z − xi‖2, 0)
2‖xj − xi‖
) ≤ ∗. (11)
The inner value is the distance between z to the bisection between xi and xj , which means if we want to
perturb z to make it closer to xj than xi, the perturbation must be larger than the inner value. Then, if we
want to perturb z such that the nearest neighbor is xj , we need to by-pass all the bisections so we need to
take the max operation among all the distances to bisections. And a lower bound of ∗ can be computed by
taking minimum over all the xj .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By definition we have∇D(j)(λ) = −AATλ− b, so
∇D(j)(λ∗) = −AATλ∗ − b
= −Aδ∗ − b.
∇D(j)i (λ∗) = −aTi δ∗ − bi
= (xi − xj)T δ∗ − ‖z − xi‖
2 − ‖z − xj‖2
2
≤ ‖xi − xj‖‖δ∗‖ − ‖z − xi‖
2 − ‖z − xj‖2
2
.
Therefore, when (8) holds, by KKT conditions of the dual problem we know λ∗i = 0.
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Figure 4: Verification (Lower bounds) via
(10) for Binary-MNIST.
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Figure 5: Verification (Lower bounds) via
(10) for MNIST.
A.4 Attack for the K > 1 case
Note that the problem is equivalent to forming A = [A1, A2] where the i-th row of A1 is (A1)i = (xj1 − xi)
and (A2)i = (xj2 − xi) for all class-1 instances {i : yi = 1}. We can first choose j1 to be the class-2
instance closest to z, then try different j2 (sorting according to the distance to j1). After solving each pair of
j1, j2, we can try to remove one row of A1 and A2 which corresponds to j3. Note that only removing j3 with
nonzero λj3 can change the result and there are only few nonzero λs, so we could simply try all of them.
A greedy and more efficient version is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: QP-greedy
Input: Target instance z, database {(xj , yj)}nj=1, neighbor parameter K.
1 while True do
2 Select a size d(K + 1)/2e subset of other-class instances S− all with the same label;
3 Solve a QP problem to make S− nearest to z + δ;
4 if feasible then
5 break;
6 end
7 end
8 Select a size b(K − 1)/2c subset of same-class instances S+ (belonging to the class the same with the
one of the test instance), of which dual variables are not 0;
9 Solve a QP problem to make S− nearest to z + δ without constraints on S+;
10 return δ;
A.5 More experimental results for K-NN verification
Since time complexity of our verification method for K-NN is independent to K, we can efficiently compute
lower bounds of the minimum adversarial perturbation for a large K. Experimental results on Binary-MNIST
are illustrated in Figure 4.
The verification method can be extended to the multi-class case. A simple way is just taking the true label
of the test instance as positive (label 1), and the others as negative (label 2). It could be easily verified that 
in (10) is still a lower bound. Experimental results on MNIST are illustrated on Figure 5.
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Table 4: The mean number of subproblems and the mean runtime of 100 correctly classified test instances. The
only difference of the two rows is whether sorting negative examples as a first stage. No parallel mechanism
is employed across test instances.
# subproblems runtime (s)
w/ sorting 2.530 8.301
w/o sorting 25.490 36.737
A.6 Effect of sorting in our Algorithm 1
We study whether sorting improves efficiency. All training data of MNIST are used as training instances. 100
correctly classified test instances are sampled randomly. All components of Algorithm 1 are employed, and
nscr = 8, i.e., 8 positive instances are used for screening. We report the mean number of subproblems and
the mean runtime of the 100 test instances. No extra parallel mechanism is employed for test instances. As
Table 4 shows, sorting reduces the number of subproblems and improves efficiency.
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